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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In EEOC v. Waffle House, the Supreme Court pronounced the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) “the master of its own 
case.”1  The EEOC has come a long way since its early days, when many 
considered the administrative agency a “toothless tiger.”2  In the 
beginning, “the EEOC was a strange hybrid creature.”3  Because the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 gave the EEOC very little statutory authority, it was 
relatively ineffective, and it lacked the power to enforce Title VII of the 
Act.4  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, however, 
amended Title VII to give the EEOC the authority to enforce 
discrimination claims.5  Since the passage of this amendment, the EEOC 
has exercised its newly-granted authority, which in turn has spurred 
litigation about the scope of the EEOC’s investigative authority.6  As a 
result, courts have been tasked with determining just how much 
enforcement authority Title VII gives the EEOC.  In particular, courts have 
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 1. 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002) (holding that the EEOC is not subject to an arbitration agreement 
between an employer and employee, and that it can still bring suit in its own name to seek victim-
specific relief). 
 2. Michael Z. Green, Proposing A New Paradigm for EEOC Enforcement After 35 Years: 
Outsourcing Charge Processing by Mandatory Mediation, 105 DICK. L. REV. 305, 352 (2001). 
 3. HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL 
POLICY 1960–1972 157 (1990). 
 4. See Green, supra note 2, at 320–21 (detailing the legislative history that contributed to the 
EEOC’s lack of enforcement power under Title VII). 
 5. Congress granted the EEOC greater enforcement authority by allowing it to commence civil 
actions in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 706(f)(1), 86 Stat. 
103, 105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012)). 
 6. See, e.g., EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 463 (5th Cir. 1997); EEOC v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 867 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2017). 
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been asked to determine how far the EEOC may stretch its investigatory 
powers.7 
Recently, Circuit courts have disagreed about the scope of the EEOC’s 
level of enforcement authority, creating a circuit split among the Fifth, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  Title VII, which prohibits discrimination on 
the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin,8 gives the EEOC 
exclusive authority to investigate workplace discrimination claims once an 
aggrieved employee files a formal charge.9  After an investigation, the 
EEOC also has the authority to conciliate, litigate, or dismiss these claims 
for lack of reasonable cause.10  Meanwhile, the aggrieved employee cannot 
bring her own suit in federal court.  Instead, she must wait for the EEOC 
to either (1) sue her employer on her behalf, or (2) issue a right-to-sue 
letter.11  Generally, the EEOC terminates its investigation into a claim once 
it gives the employee a right-to-sue letter.12  On occasion, however, the 
EEOC continues to investigate a claim even after it issues a right-to-sue 
letter.13  The circuit split concerns whether the issuance of a right-to-sue 
letter effectively limits the EEOC’s authority to continue to investigate a 
claim. 
The circuit split is indicative of a greater issue.  Courts are not sure 
how to determine the scope of the EEOC’s authority under Title VII.  
When analyzing the court decisions in this split in authority, it is unclear 
how the courts analyze the EEOC’s interpretation of its enforcement 
authority.  Each circuit court takes a different approach to decide the issue.  
While the three circuit courts agree that Title VII authorizes the EEOC to 
investigate once an aggrieved employee formally submits a claim, they 
disagree about whether Title VII imposes a limit upon this authority.  The 
Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC’s enforcement authority is split into 
distinct stages, and that a right-to-sue letter effectively prevents the EEOC 
from continuing the investigation stage.14  Conversely, the Seventh and 
                                                          
 7. See infra Section II.C. 
 8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”). 
 9. Id. § 2000e-5(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
 10. Id. § 2000e-5(b), (f)(1). 
 11. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 12. Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/la 
wsuit.cfm [https://perma.cc/5HF9-B3ZA] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) (stating “[the EEOC] will give [the 
claimant] a Notice of Right to Sue at the time the EEOC closes its investigation”). 
 13. Id. 
 14. EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 463 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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Ninth Circuits held that Title VII does not limit the investigative authority 
of the EEOC, and to find otherwise would have unfavorable consequences 
upon public policy and the effectiveness of the EEOC.15  If, however, the 
courts had applied the same level of deference to the EEOC’s 
interpretation of its investigatory authority, they would have reached the 
same conclusion.  The amount of deference courts afford agency 
interpretations, if they are to give the agency any level of deference at all, 
are traditionally determined by the standards set forth in Chevron or 
Skidmore.  If the courts applied Skidmore deference, they likely would 
have determined the EEOC’s interpretation of its investigatory authority 
was enforceable. 
The rest of this Comment proceeds as follows: Part II of this Comment 
provides the historical background of the EEOC and the Title VII 
amendments that expanded the scope of the EEOC’s enforcement 
authority, along with a description of the enforcement procedure the 
EEOC uses in investigating claims.  Part II then discusses the circuit split 
among the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  Part III argues the circuit 
courts should have applied Skidmore deference to analyze whether the 
EEOC maintains investigative authority after issuing a right-to-sue letter.  
Finally, this Comment applies the Skidmore test––examining legislative 
authority, previous court decisions, and public policy implications––and 
concludes that the EEOC’s interpretation is a valid exercise of its 
authority.  The EEOC has continuing investigative authority over claims, 
regardless of a right-to-sue letter or the aggrieved employee’s civil actions. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The EEOC’s enforcement powers have changed drastically since Title 
VII first created the agency in 1964.16  In its early years, the EEOC could 
not seek judicial remedies for workplace discrimination claims.17  In fact, 
the EEOC’s own officials gave it the unfortunate nickname “toothless 
tiger” because the agency had little authority to enforce Title VII or seek 
                                                          
 15. EEOC v. Union Pac. R.R., 867 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2017); EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 
558 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 16. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Pre 1965: Events Leading to the Creation of 
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/35th/pre1965/index.html [https://perma.cc/72UH-R5AR] 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,  Creation of EEOC] 
(providing an overview of the progression of the EEOC’s enforcement authority). 
 17. See Green, supra note 2, at 323 (noting that the EEOC was initially “an agency which merely 
receives charges, investigates them and attempts to conciliate them”).  
170 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
relief for aggrieved employees.18  It was not until 1972, when Congress 
amended Title VII, that the EEOC received the explicit authority it needed 
to seek relief for employees affected by discrimination in the American 
workplace.19  However, with this new authority came many questions, as 
employers and courts began to wonder just how much authority Title VII 
grants the EEOC. 
As the EEOC continued to test the strength of its relatively new 
authority, courts began to disagree on how to determine the scope of the 
EEOC’s authority.  With this disagreement came confusion, leading to the 
circuit split among the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits regarding the 
EEOC’s investigative power. 
A.  Title VII and Its Amendments 
In July 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 into law.20  Included in the Act was Title VII––a provision that 
prohibits discrimination in the workplace based upon race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, or in retaliation for exercising legal rights.21  To 
enforce Title VII’s provisions, Congress formed the EEOC.22 
The extent of the EEOC’s enforcement power was cause for much 
debate in the early stages of the Civil Rights Act.23  While the Education 
and Labor House Committee proposed broader enforcement authority for 
the EEOC, the Judiciary Committee advocated for less enforcement 
authority, only allowing the EEOC to bring a civil suit if conciliation 
efforts fail.24  Ultimately, Congress chose to limit the EEOC’s enforcement 
power.25  When Congress first enacted Title VII, the EEOC had the 
authority to investigate claims but not to file suit or issue cease-and-desist 
                                                          
 18. Id. at n.14 (citing ALFRED W. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT AND THE LAW 59 (1971)). 
 19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)–(f)(1) (2012 & Supp. V 2018) (authorizing the EEOC to 
conciliate and litigate employment discrimination claims). 
 20. Jacqueline A. Berrien, Statement on 50th Anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (July 2, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/history/cra50th/index.cfm  
[https://perma.cc/M36E-9687]. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 22. See id. § 2000e-4; see also Berrien, supra note 20. 
 23. See Green, supra note 2, at 320–23 (examining the Congressional debate surrounding the 
EEOC’s enforcement power and mechanisms before Title VII’s passage). 
 24. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. L. REV. 431, 435–37 (1966) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 88-914, at 2515–16 (1963)). 
 25. See, e.g., U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Creation of EEOC, supra note 16; 
Green, supra note 2, at 320–23.  
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orders.26  Title VII only allowed the EEOC “to receive, investigate, and 
conciliate complaints where it found reasonable cause to believe that 
discrimination had occurred.”27  Title VII also tasked the EEOC with 
investigating systemic patterns of discrimination in the workplace.28  If the 
EEOC could not conciliate the complaints, it was to leave the individual 
employees to bring their own suits.29  If the EEOC found evidence of 
discriminatory patterns, it was to send the issue to the Department of 
Justice for litigation.30 
When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1972, it gave the EEOC 
more enforcement authority.31  Congress recognized the EEOC’s lack of 
authority impeded the agency’s ability to enforce Title VII, which became 
a “serious defect” of the statute.32  In an attempt to strengthen the EEOC, 
the amendments to Title VII gave the Commission the power to bring civil 
suits against private employers if conciliation efforts did not resolve the 
claim.33  The 1972 amendments also allowed the EEOC to bring “pattern 
or practice” suits against the employer, a power that was originally 
assigned to the Attorney General.34 
In addition to its authority under Title VII, the EEOC’s authority 
continued to grow by other means.  The Commission was eventually given 
responsibility in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,35 the 
                                                          
 26. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(a), (e), 78 Stat. 241, 259–60 (current 
version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2012)) (granting investigatory powers in section 706(a), and 
providing that only the aggrieved party may file suit in section 706(e)). 
 27. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Creation of EEOC, supra note 16. 
 28. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a), (c) (2012) (authorizing the U.S. Attorney General to bring pattern 
or practice suits against public employers, and later authorizing the EEOC to bring pattern-or-practice 
suits against public and private employers). 
 29. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, Creation of EEOC, supra note 16.  
 30. Id. 
 31. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, sec. 2, § 701, sec. 4, § 
706, 86 Stat. 103, 103–07 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, 2000e-5 (2012)). 
 32. Anne Noel Occhialino & Daniel Vail, Why the EEOC (Still) Matters, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. L.J. 671, 677 (2005) (quoting Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Foreword in S. COMM. ON LABOR AND 
PUB. WELFARE, 92ND CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
ACT OF 1972, at III (1972)). 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2012) (“If . . . the Commission has been unable to secure from the 
respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission may bring a civil 
action against any respondent not a government, governmental agency, or political subdivision named 
in the charge.”). 
 34. Id. § 2000e-6(e). 
 35. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)) (giving the EEOC investigatory and enforcement 
powers). 
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973,36 the Americans with Disabilities Act of 
1990,37 and the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.38 
B.  EEOC Procedures 
After the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 gave the EEOC 
enforcement authority, the EEOC developed a procedure for enforcing 
Title VII discrimination claims once they were filed.39  The EEOC based 
its procedure upon Title VII, which laid out important time limits and 
provisions to ensure an enforcement process that was fair to both 
employers and employees. 
1.  The EEOC’s Investigation and Enforcement Process 
First, an aggrieved employee, a person acting on behalf of an 
employee, or an EEOC member, must file a formal workplace 
discrimination charge with the agency within 180 days of the alleged 
discrimination to trigger EEOC enforcement.40  After a claim has been 
filed, the EEOC has ten days to “serve a notice of the charge” of alleged 
unlawful employment practices on the employer.41  The EEOC must then 
launch an investigation into the claim.42  Investigations typically involve 
the EEOC requesting formal requests for information, conducting on-site 
visits, obtaining witness information, and taking any statements of 
position from the employer.43 
After the investigation, the EEOC decides whether there is 
                                                          
 36. Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791–
794 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)) (applying Title VII’s enforcement provisions to the Rehabilitation Act). 
 37. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012 & Supp. V 2018)) (applying Title VII’s enforcement provisions to the 
ADA). 
 38. Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 705 (2012 & Supp. V 
2018) and scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (2012)) (giving the EEOC power to issue regulations under 
the Act). 
 39. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm [https://perma.cc/FJ8N-YSCR] (last visited Oct. 24, 
2019) (providing an in-depth explanation on the procedures the EEOC undertakes after a charge is 
filed). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (2012). 
 41. Id. § 2000e-5(b) (providing that the notice to the employer must include “the date, place and 
circumstances of the alleged unlawful employment practice”). 
 42. Id. (providing that after serving a notice of charge, the EEOC “shall make an investigation 
thereof”). 
 43. See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed, 
supra note 39.  
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“reasonable cause” for the claim.44  If the EEOC finds there is no 
reasonable cause, it is to “dismiss the charge and promptly notify the 
person claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action.”45  If, 
however, the EEOC finds there is reasonable cause, it begins the 
enforcement process by utilizing “informal methods of conference, 
conciliation, and persuasion.”46 
Only after conciliation efforts are deemed unsuccessful by the EEOC 
may it file an action against the employer in civil court, so long as the 
employer is not a government entity.47  While the EEOC’s determination 
that conciliation was unsuccessful is subject to review by a judge, the 
Supreme Court has held that the “scope of that review is narrow,” and that 
the EEOC has “extensive discretion” to make its own determinations.48  
Further, the EEOC must wait at least thirty days after the charge was 
originally filed with the EEOC before it can turn to litigation.49  If the 
EEOC does decide to bring a civil action on behalf of the employee, it 
generally can seek injunctive and compensatory relief for the employee.50  
Title VII allows for the aggrieved employee to intervene when the 
Attorney General acts on behalf of the EEOC “in a case involving a 
government, governmental agency, or political subdivision.”51 
2.  Issuing the Right-to-Sue Letter 
Filing a claim with the EEOC does not, however, automatically 
terminate the employee’s right to bring her own civil suit.  According to 
Title VII: 
If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the 
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of 
such charge . . . the Commission has not filed a civil action under this 
section . . . or the Commission has not entered into a conciliation 
agreement to which the person aggrieved is a party, the Commission . . . 
shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the 
                                                          
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012 & Supp. V 2018). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also Mach Mining, LLC v. EEOC, 135 S. Ct. 1645, 1649–50 (2015). 
 48. Mach Mining, 135 S. Ct. at 1649. 
 49. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
 50. Jason A. McNiel, Note, The Implications of EEOC v. Waffle House: Do Settlement and 
Waiver Agreements Affect the EEOC’s Right to Seek and Obtain Victim-Specific Relief?, 38 IND. L. 
REV. 761, 764 (2005). 
 51. § 2000e-5(f)(1). 
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giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent 
named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if 
such charge was filed by a member of the Commission, by any person 
whom the charge alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful 
employment practice.52 
This notice, commonly referred to as the “right-to-sue letter,” gives 
the aggrieved employee the right to bring her own civil suit.  Although 
Title VII specifies a 180-day period before the EEOC can issue a right-to-
sue letter, the EEOC created a regulation that authorizes it to issue a right-
to-sue letter prior to the expiration of 180 days.53  Therefore, so long as the 
employee acts within 30 to 180 days from the time she originally filed her 
claim with the EEOC, the employee may send the EEOC a right-to-sue 
letter request.  This regulation has been the subject of a circuit split.54  
While the validity of the EEOC’s early right-to-sue letter is outside the 
scope of this Comment, it is notable that some courts have chosen to 
uphold the regulation,55 showing a trend that courts interpret the EEOC’s 
enforcement powers more broadly.56 
To understand the EEOC’s interpretation of its investigative authority, 
one can first look to EEOC regulations.  29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) 
establishes that the EEOC does not “terminate the processing of a 
Commissioner charge” when it issues a right-to-sue letter to an aggrieved 
employee.57  The EEOC Compliance Manual shows the EEOC interprets 
the phrase “processing of a Commissioner charge” to include 
investigations.58  This regulatory language is consistent with the EEOC’s 
position in the three circuit court cases addressing this issue.59 
                                                          
 52. Id. 
 53. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(2) (2018). 
 54. See Robert A. Kearney, Who’s “In Charge” at the EEOC?, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 14–20 
(2001) (discussing the circuit split and the various court decisions regarding whether the EEOC may 
issue a right-to-sue letter prior to 180 days). 
 55. See Walker v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 240 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding the 
EEOC’s issuance of a right-to-sue letter prior to the expiration of 180 days was a valid exercise of the 
Commission’s authority); Brown v. Puget Sound Elec. Apprenticeship & Training Tr., 732 F.2d 726, 
729 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding the EEOC’s early right-to-sue letter was valid).  But see Martini v. Fed. 
Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding the EEOC’s early right-to-sue 
letter was invalid). 
 56. See infra Section III.B.2. 
 57. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) (2018). 
 58. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 6.4 CONTINUED 
PROCESSING AFTER NRTS IS ISSUED (2006), 2006 WL 4672976 (using the word “processing” the 
charge and “investigation” interchangeably).  
 59. See infra Section II.C. 
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C.  The Circuit Split 
Since the 1972 amendments to Title VII, three circuits have addressed 
whether the EEOC can continue to investigate claims after it issues a right-
to-sue letter.  Each circuit came to its conclusion using a different analysis.  
The Fifth Circuit did not take much time to discuss the purpose of the 
EEOC’s enforcement authority or the policy implications, but rather 
interpreted the language in Title VII in its decision to limit the EEOC’s 
investigatory power.60  Conversely, both the Ninth Circuit and the Seventh 
Circuit concluded that, because Title VII does not prohibit much of the 
EEOC’s investigatory powers, it must allow the EEOC to investigate after 
the employee files suit.61 
The following Parts of this Comment examine decisions of the Fifth, 
Ninth, and Seventh Circuits, identifying the stronger and weaker points of 
each decision, and how the three circuits came to their conclusions. 
1.  The Fifth Circuit 
The first case to tackle this issue was EEOC v. Hearst Corp., where 
the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC may not continue an investigation 
once it gives the aggrieved employee the right-to-sue letter.62  In Hearst, 
two employees filed claims with the EEOC against their employer alleging 
sexual harassment.63  During its investigation, the EEOC issued the 
employer two subpoenas.64  Prior to the conclusion of the EEOC’s 
investigation, the aggrieved employees requested right-to-sue letters, 
which the EEOC granted.65  Two days after the EEOC issued the letters, 
the employer petitioned to revoke the subpoenas, which the EEOC 
denied.66  The EEOC eventually turned to the district court to enforce the 
subpoenas, but the employer argued it was not obligated to comply 
because the EEOC lacked authority to conduct an investigation after 
issuing a right-to-sue letter.67 
Although the district court disagreed with the employer’s argument 
                                                          
 60. EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 464–67 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 61. EEOC v. Fed. Express Corp., 558 F.3d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Union Pac. R.R., 
867 F.3d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 62. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d at 463.   
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 464. 
 67. Id. 
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and ruled in favor of the EEOC,68 the Fifth Circuit overturned the district 
court’s ruling.69  The Fifth Circuit held that once the employee initiates 
litigation, the EEOC may no longer continue investigating that claim.70  In 
coming to its conclusion, the Fifth Circuit relied upon Title VII and the 
United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Occidental Life Insurance Co. 
v. EEOC.71  The Fifth Circuit identified four stages of the EEOC’s Title 
VII enforcement procedure stemming from Occidental: “filing and notice 
of charge, investigation, conference and conciliation, and finally, 
enforcement.”72  The Fifth Circuit stated that once the employee initiates 
litigation, the EEOC’s enforcement stage begins.73  The beginning of the 
enforcement stage therefore ends the investigation stage and the EEOC 
may no longer continue to investigate.74 
The Fifth Circuit also briefly examined the legislative history of the 
1972 Title VII amendments.  The court quoted a Senate Conference 
Report, which stated that the amendments would enable “the EEOC to 
process a charge of employment discrimination through the investigation 
and conciliation stages,”75 and the EEOC only had the authority to seek 
court involvement “if it has been unable to eliminate an alleged unlawful 
employment practice by informal methods.”76  The court found that these 
statements from the report show Congress intended to create the four 
distinct stages of EEOC enforcement.77  Thus, before the EEOC enters the 
enforcement stage by issuing a right-to-sue letter, Title VII requires that 
the EEOC must first exhaust the informal methods of investigation and 
conciliation.  The Fifth Circuit believed that allowing the EEOC to issue a 
                                                          
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 463. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 468.  The Fifth Circuit is careful to mention that, despite using language from 
Occidental to make its determination, Occidental was not controlling because the court did “not decide 
what independent enforcement authority remains with the EEOC now that the private parties have 
initiated their own enforcement proceedings.”  Id. at 468–69.  The Fifth Circuit thus concluded “only 
that the time for investigation has passed.”  Id. at 469.  See also Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 
432 U.S. 355 (1977); infra Section III.B.2. 
 72. EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 468 (5th Cir. 1997). 
 73. See id. at 469 (concluding “[t]he ‘alternative enforcement procedure’ identified by the Court 
in Occidental has begun, and the time for investigation based upon Lamb’s and Waddell’s charges has 
passed”). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. (“That Title VII’s enforcement structure is deliberately divided into distinct stages is 
confirmed by the legislative history of the 1972 amendments, which first invested the EEOC with its 
broad enforcement authority.”). 
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right-to-sue letter prior to the termination of the investigation would blur 
the lines between the separate stages and frustrate the purpose of Title 
VII.78 
The Fifth Circuit based its decision upon a plain language 
interpretation of Title VII.79  It did not venture to address the EEOC’s 
interpretation of the statute.  Additionally, the court did not further explain 
how or why it determined that each of the four stages of EEOC 
enforcement must exist separately, aside from noting that Title VII allows 
the EEOC to file suit after deciding it is unable to use informal methods.  
However, relying solely upon a plain language interpretation is a mistake 
because the text of Title VII is ambiguous.80  This weakness within the 
Fifth Circuit’s holding led both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits to reject 
the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation. 
2.  The Ninth Circuit 
In EEOC v. Federal Express Corp., the Ninth Circuit held the EEOC 
may continue to investigate a claim even after the complaining employee 
initiates litigation or joins a class action.81  In Federal Express, an African 
American FedEx employee filed a race discrimination claim with the 
EEOC.82  Because the employee wanted to join a class action suit that had 
already been filed, the employee requested a right-to-sue letter.83  The 
EEOC granted the employee the letter but informed him that the EEOC 
“would continue to process [the employee]’s charge.”84  The EEOC then 
issued a subpoena relating to the charge.85  When FedEx would not fulfill 
the subpoena request, the EEOC sought to enforce the subpoena and filed 
an action in district court.86  The district court granted the EEOC’s 
application to enforce the subpoena, noting that “[t]he breadth of power 
granted the EEOC to investigate discrimination charges is such that 
                                                          
 78. See id. at 469 (“Congress granted the EEOC broad investigatory authority so that the agency 
promptly and effectively could determine whether Title VII had been violated, and to assist the agency 
in its efforts to resolve disputes without formal litigation.  These purposes are no longer served once 
formal litigation is commenced.”). 
 79. Id. at 468. 
 80. See infra Section III.B.1.b. 
 81. 558 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2009). 
 82. Id.  
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 845–46. 
 86. Id. at 846. 
178 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
validity of an administrative subpoena is not weakened unless the EEOC 
‘plainly lack[s]’ jurisdiction.”87 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit considered two relevant questions to 
determine whether a court may enforce an agency’s administrative 
subpoena: “(1) whether Congress has granted the authority to investigate; 
[and] (2) whether procedural requirements have been followed.”88  To the 
first question, the Ninth Circuit noted that courts have a “strictly limited 
role” in determining an agency’s jurisdictional authority, and one should 
only question this authority if jurisdiction is “plainly lacking.”89  Because 
the Ninth Circuit found “at least a plausible basis for jurisdiction,” this part 
of the two-part test was met.90  To the second question, the Ninth Circuit 
examined the enforcement procedure provided in Title VII91 and 
emphasized that the EEOC must investigate once a claim has been filed 
according to Title VII.92  Because Title VII requires the EEOC to 
investigate, the court determined that Congress intended to give the EEOC 
broad investigatory powers.  The court also noted that 29 C.F.R. § 
1601.28(a)(3) is consistent with the EEOC’s actions in the case.93  
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that the procedural requirement to 
investigate a filed claim was met.94 
The Ninth Circuit concluded by explicitly rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s 
Hearst decision on four separate grounds.95  First, the court found that the 
Fifth Circuit erroneously stated that each stage of the EEOC’s 
investigatory authority is “distinct” because “the beginning of another 
stage does not necessarily terminate the preceding stage, and Title VII 
confers upon the EEOC investigatory authority during each stage.”96  
Second, the Ninth Circuit explained that the Fifth Circuit’s decision 
implies the charging party’s actions control the EEOC’s authority.97  
                                                          
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 848 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting its previous decision in EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 
260 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2001)).   
 89. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1983)). 
 90. Id. at 848–49. 
 91. Id. at 849–50 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012)). 
 92. Id. at 849 (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 359 (1977)). 
 93. See id. at 850 (holding that the EEOC’s actions were consistent with 29 C.F.R. § 
1601.28(a)(3) because the EEOC issued the employee a right-to-sue letter upon his request and 
continued to investigate the employer when it believed the employer had a pattern of violating Title 
VII).  
 94. Id.  
 95. Id. at 851–54. 
 96. Id. at 851–52. 
 97. Id. at 852. 
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Instead, the Ninth Circuit contended Title VII makes the EEOC, not the 
charging party, in control of the charge.98  Third, the Ninth Circuit attacked 
the Fifth Circuit’s assertion that Title VII’s purposes are complete once 
the charging party has filed suit.99  This, according to the Ninth Circuit, 
was an incorrect interpretation of the EEOC’s purpose.100  The Ninth 
Circuit explained that “the EEOC’s investigatory authority serves a greater 
purpose than just investigating a charge on behalf of an individual.”101  
Finally, the Ninth Circuit insisted there is no provision within Title VII 
that would restrict the EEOC’s investigative authority once the charging 
party has filed suit.102 
The Ninth Circuit oversimplified the issue.  It asked whether the 
EEOC fulfilled its required procedures under Title VII when the agency 
investigated the claim, but whether the EEOC may continue to investigate 
a claim after it issues a right-to-sue letter is more a question of the EEOC’s 
investigative limits.  The Ninth Circuit examined Title VII’s text to ensure 
the EEOC followed its procedural guidelines, but it did not attempt to 
interpret whether Title VII places limits upon the EEOC’s investigative 
authority.  The Ninth Circuit’s failure to address the legislative history of 
Title VII or to analyze the Supreme Court precedent on the EEOC’s 
enforcement authority results in gaps in its analysis. 
3.  The Seventh Circuit 
In EEOC v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., the most recent case to 
address whether the EEOC maintains investigative authority after the 
issuance of a right-to-sue letter, the Seventh Circuit sided with the Ninth 
Circuit, deepening the circuit split.103  But the Seventh Circuit went further 
than the Ninth Circuit, finding that the EEOC may continue to investigate 
a claim even after a final and valid judgment is entered against an 
employee.104  In this case, two Union Pacific employees filed racial 
discrimination charges with the EEOC.105  The EEOC eventually granted 
the employees right-to-sue letters upon the employees’ request.106  The 
                                                          
 98. Id. (citing EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002)).  
 99. Id. at 852–53. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 852. 
 102. Id. at 853. 
 103. EEOC v. Union Pac. R.R., 867 F.3d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 104. Id. at 851. 
 105. Id. at 845–46. 
 106. Id. at 846. 
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employees then filed suit against Union Pacific, but the district court 
granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the 
claims with prejudice.107  During this time, the EEOC was continuing its 
investigation into the claim and issued a second subpoena to Union 
Pacific.108  Union Pacific refused to comply with the subpoenas.109  The 
EEOC then turned to the district court for enforcement, which was 
granted.110 
In affirming the district court, the Seventh Circuit applied an abuse of 
discretion standard to review the enforcement of the subpoenas111––a 
standard appellate courts often use to review lower court 
determinations.112  In its analysis, the Seventh Circuit first looked to Title 
VII’s text.  The Seventh Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, reasoned that 
“while a valid charge is a requirement for beginning an EEOC 
investigation, nothing in Title VII supports a ruling that the EEOC’s 
authority is then limited by the actions of the charging individual.”113  The 
Seventh Circuit also pointed out that the EEOC is separate from the 
employee and does not act solely on the employee’s behalf.114  Therefore, 
the employee cannot control the actions of the EEOC.115  The court stated 
that allowing employee actions to control the EEOC would undermine the 
purpose of the EEOC’s investigative authority and render it as “merely 
derivative” of the aggrieved employee.116  The public policy implications 
of such a finding, the court insisted, are “disturbing” and would result in 
the EEOC representing the general public in fewer claims.117 
While the Seventh Circuit analyzed Title VII and its legislative history 
in greater depth than the Ninth Circuit, it too failed to address the more 
ambiguous provisions of Title VII, such as whether the statute provides 
any limits on the EEOC’s authority.  Because each side of the circuit split 
applied different analyses to reach its conclusions, one is left with the 
question: how should the limits of the EEOC’s investigative authority be 
                                                          
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 847. 
 112. See, e.g., McLane Co. v. EEOC, 137 S. Ct. 1159, 1162 (2017) (“[N]early every Court of Appeals 
reviews a district court’s decision whether to enforce an EEOC subpoena for abuse of discretion.”). 
 113. Union Pac. R.R., 867 F.3d at 849. 
 114. Id. at 849–50. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. at 851. 
 117. Id. 




One issue has become clear from this circuit split: the courts are 
uncertain how to determine the extent of the EEOC’s investigatory power.  
The courts should have addressed the issue of deference.  There is some 
debate regarding which level of deference the EEOC’s interpretations are 
entitled.118  This Comment argues the deference standard articulated in 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.119 is most appropriate.  If the Fifth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuits had applied Skidmore deference, they likely would have 
come to a more unified conclusion regarding whether a post-right-to-sue 
letter investigation is an appropriate demonstration of the EEOC’s Title 
VII enforcement power. 
A.  Determining the Appropriate Deference Test 
Generally, when analyzing an administrative agency’s authority, 
courts begin by addressing how the agency interprets its own statutory 
authority.120  Courts then determine the level of deference the 
interpretation should be afforded.121  The two most commonly applied 
levels of deference are the Chevron122 and the Skidmore123 tests.  Chevron 
is the standard that affords an administrative agency the highest degree of 
deference.124  If a court determines a statutory provision is “ambiguous,” 
                                                          
 118. See, e.g., Eric E. Petry, Comment, Master of Its Own Case: EEOC Investigations After Issuing 
a Right-to-Sue Notice, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1227 (2018) (arguing the EEOC’s 29 CFR § 1601.28(a)(3) 
is entitled to Chevron deference); Jamie A. Yavelberg, Note, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: 
Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. Aramco., 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 202 (1992) 
(arguing Skidmore is the appropriate deference level for judicial review of interpretive rules); see also 
Theodore W. Wern, Note, Judicial Deference to EEOC Interpretations of the Civil Rights Act, the 
ADA, and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1533, 1552–56 (1999) 
(pointing out that courts used to afford the EEOC “great deference” when considering Title VII issues, 
but have applied deference less consistently in recent years). 
 119. 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 120. David Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 144 (2010) (“[Deference] tests 
apply depending on the source of law that the agency uses to justify the action being disputed in 
court.”). 
 121. Id. at 143–44 (“Agency interpretations of law are, if reviewable at all, reviewable under one 
of three basic standards: the deferential Chevron standard, the less deferential Skidmore standard—
which applies when the test set forth in United States v. Mead is met—and the no-deference-at-all 
standard of de novo review.”). 
 122. Id. at 144–45.  
 123. Id. at 146. 
 124. Id. at 143–45. 
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Chevron requires the court to defer to the agency interpretation as long as 
it is “based on a permissible construction of the statute.”125  Skidmore, on 
the other hand, affords the agency less deference.126  Skidmore only 
requires a court to uphold an agency interpretation if the agency can 
persuade the court of the validity of its interpretation.127  Whether a court 
applies Chevron or Skidmore depends on what interpretive authority the 
governing statute gives the agency.128  If a court determines Congress 
intended the governing statute to grant an agency the authority to make 
laws based upon interpretations of the statutes, the court gives the agency 
Chevron deference.129  Otherwise, the agency receives Skidmore 
deference.130 
Here, because the EEOC is attempting to enforce its own 
interpretation of its authority under Title VII, some sort of deference test 
is appropriate.131  Interestingly, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits all 
failed to address deference in their analyses.132  Perhaps this is because of 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to apply deference tests to EEOC 
questions.  In the early years of the EEOC, the Supreme Court seemed to 
apply a more Chevron-like standard, holding the EEOC’s interpretations 
of Title VII were entitled to “great deference.”133  This changed, however, 
after the Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.134  Quoting 
Skidmore, the Court applied a far less deferential standard to analyze an 
EEOC interpretative guideline.135  Since Gilbert, courts have struggled to 
                                                          
 125. Id. at 144 (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
(1984)). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 146; see also infra Section III.A.2. 
 128. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court 
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1097–99 
(2008). 
 129. Id. at 1109.  This rule is known as “Step Zero” of the Chevron deference test and it must be 
satisfied before conducting further analysis under Chevron.  See VALERIE C. BRANNON & JARED P. 
COLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44954, CHEVRON DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 4 (2017), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44954.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZN3-D8N7]. 
 130. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 128, at 1109 (“[W]hen Congress has not delegated lawmaking 
authority to the agency, Skidmore deference governs.”).  
 131. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–28 (2001). 
 132. The Seventh Circuit did mention Chevron in a footnote.  However, it merely acknowledged 
that Union Pacific had “challenge[d] whether [§ 1601.28(a)(3)] is entitled to Chevron deference based 
on its contrary construction of Title VII.”  EEOC v. Union Pac. R.R., 867 F.3d 843, 850 n.5 (7th Cir. 
2017).  The court dismissed this argument and did not address Chevron again. 
 133. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971). 
 134. 429 U.S. 125, 140–41 (1976); see also John S. Moot, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to 
EEOC Interpretative Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213, 222–32 (1987). 
 135. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141–43. 
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determine how much deference to give the EEOC’s Title VII 
interpretations.136 
There is some speculation about why the Court has been reluctant to 
apply a level of deference to EEOC regulations.  One author suggests the 
lack of deference could be because of the EEOC’s historical lack of 
enforcement powers, its non-technical and relatively uncomplex area of 
expertise, and the need for Congress to be in charge of delicate policy 
issues such as those handled by the EEOC.137  Regardless of its reasoning, 
the Supreme Court’s reluctance to specify the level of deference to afford 
the EEOC has left lower courts without guidance.  For this reason, courts 
may choose to follow the Supreme Court and not specify any level of 
deference at all.  However, as this circuit split demonstrates, the courts’ 
inconsistent analyses lead to further confusion and unsettled law.  Despite 
the apparent reluctance, the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII is entitled 
to some level of deference. 
1.  Chevron is Not the Appropriate Analysis 
One solution to this issue is to apply the Chevron test to determine the 
validity of the EEOC’s interpretation of its authority to continue to 
investigate a claim after issuing a right-to-sue letter.138  Chevron allows 
courts to have a greater regard for a federal agency’s interpretation of the 
law by asking only whether the interpretation was reasonable.139  In recent 
years, Chevron has become a controversial topic, as conservatives argue it 
gives too much power to the government via administrative agencies.140  
Even some Supreme Court Justices have become skeptical of Chevron.141 
                                                          
 136. See infra Section III.A.1. 
 137. Wern, supra note 118, at 1578–80.  
 138. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(4) (2018) (stating that “[t]he issuance of a notice of right to sue does 
not preclude the Commission from offering such assistance to a person issued such notice as the 
Commission deems necessary or appropriate”). 
 139. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
 140. Michael Phillis, Justices Won’t Hear Chevron Test Over FWS Otter Program, LAW360 (Oct. 
29, 2018, 9:54 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1096502 [https://perma.cc/ZW3F-VMFK]. 
 141. See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation Judging Statutes, 129 HARV. L. REV. 
2118, 2118 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014), and noting that then-
Judge Kavanaugh considers aspects of statutory interpretation methods, including Chevron, to be 
“troubling”); Randolph J. May, Judge Kavanaugh and the ‘Chevron Deference,’ WASH. TIMES (July 12, 
2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jul/12/judge-kavanaugh-and-the-chevron-deference/ 
[https://perma.cc/WSC6-77ES] (“Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil 
Gorsuch are in the camp of Chevron skeptics.”); Arthur G. Sapper & Gwendolyn K. Nightengale, Supreme 
Court Places Another Limitation on Chevron Deference, NAT’L L. REV. (May 31, 2019), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/supreme-court-places-another-limitation-chevron-deference 
184 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
 
The Supreme Court has been increasingly reluctant to apply Chevron 
deference to EEOC cases—particularly cases evaluating the EEOC’s 
interpretation of Title VII.142  In fact, the Supreme Court rarely invokes 
Chevron deference in cases involving the EEOC’s interpretation of Title 
VII.143  This is largely because “the EEOC was not given rulemaking 
authority to interpret the substantive provisions of Title VII.”144  In an 
attempt to provide guidance in this area, the EEOC published a document 
titled What You Should Know about EEOC Regulations, Subregulatory 
Guidance and other Resource Documents.145  In the document, the EEOC 
explains that Chevron’s “reasonableness” test only applies to the agency’s 
interpretation of Title VII in “procedural, reporting, and record keeping 
matters.”146  Simply put, courts will only apply Chevron to the EEOC’s 
procedural matters.  The EEOC further states that courts will analyze the 
EEOC’s “interpretive regulations” by electing to allow the interpretations 
only if “they find EEOC’s positions to be persuasive.”147  In other words, 
“interpretive regulations” are entitled to the less-deferential Skidmore test. 
It is not entirely clear whether the EEOC’s interpretation of its 
investigative authority under Title VII is a “procedural matter” or an 
“interpretive regulation.”  The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) lends 
only a small amount of guidance, and most courts take language from the 
APA to define procedural rules as “rules of agency organization, 
procedure, or practice.”148  Courts have also gone beyond the language of 
the ADA to establish what agency rules they consider to be “procedural.”  
                                                          
[https://perma.cc/9ZP4-KGXQ] (“On May 28, 2019, the Court in Smith v. Berryhill carved another 
exception into what has lately proven to be its least-favored precedent.”); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 
2105, 2121 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems necessary and appropriate to reconsider . . . 
the premises that underlie Chevron and how courts have implemented that decision.”). 
 142. James J. Brudney, Chevron and Skidmore in the Workplace: Unhappy Together, 83 
FORDHAM L. REV. 497, 507–08 (2014). 
 143. Id. (stating that “since 1984, the Court has never relied on Chevron when reviewing EEOC 
interpretations of Title VII text”).  But see Petry, supra note 118, at 1253–54 (2018) (explaining that 
“the Court has shown willingness to defer to the EEOC’s procedural regulations”). 
 144. Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 122 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing 
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 257 (1991)). 
 145. What You Should Know about EEOC Regulations, Subregulatory Guidance and other Resource 
Documents, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/ 
regulations_guidance_resources.cfm [https://perma.cc/2DCE-RV2H] (last visited Oct. 24, 2019) [hereinafter 
What You Should Know]. 
 146. Id.  While the document does not explicitly reference Chevron, it details the deference courts 
practice in the EEOC’s issuance of their own regulations.  See id.  
 147. Id.  
 148. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).  See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 313–16 
(1979); Batterton v. Marshall, 648 F.2d 694, 700–01 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Taylor v. Sec’y of Health & 
Human Servs., No. 90-5675, 1991 WL 1104 at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 1991) (unpublished). 
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In a D.C. Circuit decision, the court stated that an agency’s procedural 
rulemaking “should not be deemed to include any action which goes 
beyond formality and substantially affects the rights of those over whom 
the agency exercises authority.”149  While arguably a formal procedural 
issue, the EEOC’s authority from 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28 is likely beyond 
mere formality of the EEOC’s procedure.  The enforcement authority the 
EEOC gives itself under the regulation could substantially affect the rights 
of employers and employees.150  Further, the EEOC’s authority to continue 
investigations does not simply dictate how the EEOC must act but also 
creates obligations for employers and employees.  For example, if the 
EEOC subpoenas an employer, the employer is expected to comply.  This 
interpretation of authority would decide how long the employer must 
expect EEOC interference, potentially affecting the employers’ policies 
and practices.  Many employers likely oppose the EEOC’s interpretation 
of its own authority because of the extra burden it could place upon the 
workplace.  The EEOC’s interpretation of the extent of its investigatory 
authority is therefore probably more within the “interpretive regulation” 
realm than a mere “procedural matter.” 
One author, Eric Petry, argues the courts should have applied Chevron 
deference and that the EEOC’s interpretation of its investigatory authority 
is more likely a procedural interpretation of Title VII.151  Petry supported 
his argument by looking to the Supreme Court, noting the question of 
whether the EEOC may continue its investigation after issuing a right-to-
sue letter is similar to the Supreme Court’s analyses of two EEOC 
interpretations in EEOC v. Commercial Office Products Co. and Edelman 
v. Lynchburg College.152  Petry reasons that because the Court implicitly 
used Chevron in Commercial Office and Edelman to determine similar 
issues, these issues are probably procedural matters and Chevron is 
appropriate.153 
This argument, however, is flawed.  In Commercial Office, the Court 
purported to use a “reasonableness” standard to support the EEOC’s 
regulation that a state agency’s proceedings are terminated when it waives 
its initial processing period.154  While Petry argues this analysis is 
                                                          
 149. Pickus v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 150. See infra Section III.B.3. 
 151. Petry, supra note 118, at 1258–59. 
 152. Id. at 1253. 
 153. Id. at 1257. 
 154. EEOC v. Commercial Office Prods. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 115 (1988). 
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consistent with the deference standard Chevron offers,155 the Commercial 
Office Court did not stop once it determined the regulation was reasonable.  
Instead, the Court continued and analyzed whether there were any 
alternative interpretations the EEOC could have made.156  The Court 
concluded that the EEOC’s interpretation was the only one possible and 
that alternatives, such as those suggested by the respondent, would be 
“absurd.”157  As Justice O’Connor pointed out in her concurring opinion, 
by making these additional determinations, the Court applied a more 
intensive analysis rather than a mere “reasonableness” test as required by 
Chevron.158 
The Court’s decision in Edelman is equally unpersuasive.  Petry 
argues the Edelman Court used a Chevron-like test to determine whether 
an EEOC regulation permits a complainant to verify an EEOC charge after 
the deadline to file passes.159  As Petry acknowledges in his article, 
however, Edelman explicitly stated it would not address the issue of 
deference.160  In fact, it held that although the EEOC’s regulation was 
reasonable, even without applying the deference test, upholding the EEOC 
regulation was “the position we would adopt even if there were no formal 
rule and we were interpreting the statute from scratch.”161  Petry argues the 
Court implicitly afforded Chevron deference to the EEOC, while the 
Court, in fact, explicitly declined to apply any sort of deference to the 
EEOC regulation at all, treating the issue as more of a statutory analysis 
case than an administrative authority case.162 
It appears the Court was uncomfortable giving the EEOC strong 
deference required by Chevron to determine the validity of EEOC 
enforcement power interpretations in Commercial Office and Edelman.  
This seems to suggest that these issues are more interpretive regulations 
than mere procedural matters.  Chevron deference is thus probably 
inappropriate.  Applying a simple reasonableness test to determine the 
validity of the EEOC’s interpretation would give too much deference to 
                                                          
 155. Petry, supra note 118, at 1258.  
 156. Commercial Office, 486 U.S. at 115–20. 
 157. Id. at 120. 
 158. See id. at 125 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“But while I agree with much of what the majority 
says . . . in indicating that the agency’s construction is reasonable, in my view the majority goes too 
far by suggesting that the agency’s position is the only one permissible.”). 
 159. Petry, supra note 118, at 1253–54. 
 160. See id. at 1254; Edelman v. Lynchburg Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (“But there is no need 
to resolve any question of deference here.”). 
 161. Id. (“Because we so clearly agree with the EEOC, there is no occasion to defer and no point 
in asking what kind of deference, or how much.”). 
 162. Petry, supra note 118, at 1254; see also Edelman, 535 U.S. at 114. 
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the EEOC as it determines its own enforcement power. 
Given the Supreme Court’s treatment of similar issues—like in 
Commercial Office and Edelman—and the strong effect the EEOC’s 
interpretation of its investigative authority would have upon the 
workplace, it is probably an interpretive regulation rather than a procedural 
matter.  Further, the Supreme Court has historically been reluctant to apply 
Chevron to EEOC Title VII interpretations.  Even the validity of the 
Chevron test has been called into question.  For these reasons, Chevron is 
probably not the appropriate analysis to apply to this issue. 
2.  The Skidmore Test is a More Appropriate Analysis 
The Supreme Court occasionally applies the less deferential Skidmore 
test when analyzing the EEOC’s Title VII interpretations.163  Skidmore is 
appropriate where “statutory circumstances indicate no intent to delegate 
general authority to make rules with force of law, or where such authority 
was not invoked.”164  Further, because 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) is likely 
an interpretive regulation, the EEOC’s interpretation is entitled to 
deference so long as it is persuasive.165 
The Skidmore test does not provide much guidance to courts, as it only 
requires courts to give weight to an agency interpretation based upon the 
agency’s persuasiveness.  Under this test, a court analyzes agency 
interpretations by considering “the thoroughness evident in [the agency’s] 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and 
later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control.”166  To determine an agency’s 
persuasiveness, courts generally look to the Congressional intent of the 
statute,167 consistent interpretations of the agency’s authority,168 and the 
overall persuasiveness of the agency’s reasoning,169 such as public policy 
                                                          
 163. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1937, 1942 (2006). 
 164. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 237 (2001). 
 165. See What You Should Know, supra note 145 (“Regulations issued by EEOC without explicit 
authority from Congress, called ‘interpretive regulations,’ do not create any new legal rights or 
obligations, and are followed by courts only to the extent they find EEOC’s positions to be 
persuasive.”). 
 166. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 167. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258–59 (1991) (“Petitioners have failed to 
present sufficient affirmative evidence that Congress intended Title VII to apply broadly.”). 
 168. Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (examining the EEOC’s earlier 
interpretations of Title VII to determine whether the interpretation at issue was consistent with the 
EEOC’s past actions). 
 169. Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 361–62 (2013). 
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implications. 
B.  Applying a Skidmore Analysis 
In determining whether the issuance of a right-to-sue letter effectively 
limits the EEOC’s investigative authority, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits each seemed to use elements of Skidmore.  But they all failed to 
conduct a full analysis.  Here, because the EEOC interpretation is entitled 
to Skidmore deference, the circuit courts should have each answered the 
following three questions: (1) what enforcement authority did Congress 
intend to grant to the EEOC under Title VII?; (2) is the EEOC' 
interpretation consistent with past interpretations of the EEOC’s 
enforcement authority?; and (3) what are the public policy implications of 
a ruling on this issue? 
Had the courts properly applied Skidmore and answered these three 
questions, they likely would have come to the same conclusion: the EEOC 
does have the authority to investigate Title VII claims after issuing a right-
to-sue letter to the aggrieved employee. 
1.  Title VII’s Congressional Intent 
Title VII gives both explicit and implicit instructions regarding the 
EEOC’s enforcement authority.  Title VII’s text provides some 
understanding of the EEOC’s purpose.  In areas where the extent of this 
authority becomes less clear, legislative history lends guidance to 
congressional intent.  When the EEOC’s interpretation of the statute 
closely mirrors the statutory language and congressional intent, courts find 
the interpretation to be more persuasive under the Skidmore test. 
a.  The EEOC’s Enforcement Authority under Title VII 
Title VII explicitly gives the EEOC enforcement authority.170  The 
limitations Title VII places upon this authority, however, are not clear.  
Title VII gives the EEOC’s enforcement authority few temporal limits, as 
it only gives the EEOC a deadline by which it must grant an aggrieved 
party a right-to-sue letter.171  Courts have not considered this deadline a 
time limit upon the EEOC’s investigative authority, but rather a restriction 
upon the aggrieved employee’s right to bring a private action, as he or she 
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must first wait out the 180-day period.172  As Petry notes, “Just as Title VII 
imposes no requirement that the EEOC ‘conclude its conciliation efforts 
and bring an enforcement suit within any maximum period of time,’ it also 
should not be read to impose an arbitrary temporal cap on the EEOC’s 
investigatory powers.”173  Legislative history supports this interpretation.  
In the House report on the 1972 amendment, the Education and Labor 
Committee addressed the 180-day provision from the statute, stating “[t]he 
primary concern must be protection of the aggrieved person’s option to 
seek a prompt remedy in the best manner available.”174  This provision 
alleviates that concern by allowing the aggrieved employee to regain rights 
over his or her own claim after a limited amount of time.  What this 
provision does not do, however, is explicitly or implicitly require the 
EEOC to surrender its right to the claim after this time period has passed. 
b.  The EEOC’s InvestigativeAuthority under Title VII 
Title VII unambiguously grants the EEOC investigatory authority.  As 
both the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit point out, Title VII not only 
authorizes the EEOC to conduct investigations but it also explicitly 
requires the EEOC to investigate once a formal charge is made.175  The 
statute provides: “Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person 
claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission, alleging that 
an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful employment practice, the 
Commission . . . shall make an investigation thereof.”176 
At first glance, the language of the statute may appear to place limits 
on this investigative authority.  By explicitly asserting that the EEOC shall 
investigate when a charge is made, Congress might have intended for the 
actions of an aggrieved employee to control the EEOC’s investigations 
and enforcement authority.  Authors Shawn Twing and Travis Odom note 
legislative history showing Congressional intent “to limit the EEOC to 
investigating only those employers against whom parties have filed 
charges.”177  To support this argument, the authors cite to a memorandum 
by Senators Clark and Case, which states: “It is important to note that the 
                                                          
 172. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977). 
 173. Petry, supra note 118, at 1263 (quoting Occidental, 432 U.S. at 360). 
 174. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238, at 2148 (1972). 
 175.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012). 
 176. Id. (emphasis added). 
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10 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 369, 373 (2009) (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 65 (1984)). 
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Commission’s power to conduct an investigation can be exercised only 
after a specific charge has been filed in writing.”178  Twing and Odom also 
point out that in Hearst, the Fifth Circuit noted that “[u]nlike some other 
agencies, the EEOC does not possess plenary authority to demand 
information that it considers relevant to its area of jurisdiction.  The 
EEOC’s authority to investigate in Title VII cases is triggered only by the 
filing of a formal charge.”179  This evidence of legislative intent indicates 
Congress wanted to tie the EEOC’s authority to the actions of the 
employee.  If the employee’s charge triggers an EEOC investigation, it is 
not unreasonable to assume Congress intended to limit the EEOC’s 
authority. 
While this interpretation of Title VII is accurate, to conclude 
Congressional intent to limit the reach of the EEOC’s investigative 
authority is also evidence of an intent to establish when the EEOC’s 
investigative authority may end would be erroneous.  Title VII only 
requires an employee to file a formal charge as a prerequisite to the 
EEOC’s investigation because Congress intended the employee charge to 
be a triggering event for the EEOC.  More likely, Congress imposed upon 
the EEOC the requirement that it investigate each claim filed to provide 
protection to aggrieved employees.  The provision therefore likely does 
not place a limitation upon the EEOC’s investigative authority, nor does 
the provision subject the EEOC to the actions of the employee. 
There is very little in Title VII that limits the EEOC’s authority.  42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-8 addresses the authorization the EEOC possesses to 
investigate discrimination claims.  The section begins by providing: 
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under section 
2000e-5 of this title, the Commission or its designated representative 
shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of 
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being 
investigated or proceeded against that relates to unlawful employment 
practices covered by this subchapter and is relevant to the charge under 
investigation.180 
The investigatory power restrictions explicit in this statute require that 
the information sought be “relevant to the charge under investigation.”181  
While this statute leaves some ambiguity as to what is considered 
                                                          
 178. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 64 (1984)). 
 179. Id. (quoting EEOC v. Hearst Corp., 103 F.3d 462, 464 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
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“relevant,” the Supreme Court has specified that this provision is not 
“especially constraining” and has consistently been “generously 
construed” by courts.182  Therefore, the only limitation upon the EEOC’s 
investigatory power found in Title VII is a relatively lenient rule. 
Arguably, the leniency afforded to the EEOC under this provision 
could be limited to the scope of EEOC investigations.  While the standard 
established by this statute could allow the EEOC a wide range in 
determining what is relevant to the charge, it may be more constraining if 
one asks how long information may be considered relevant to the charge.  
The language preceding the relevancy standard, however, suggests 
Congress did not intend to place such a temporal limit.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
8 explicitly allows the EEOC to “at all reasonable times have access to 
[relevant information] for the purposes of investigation.”183  Rather than 
imposing any restrictions, this provision appears to give the EEOC more 
latitude to determine when investigations should be done.  Legislative 
history shows Congress intended to give the EEOC “broad powers to 
conduct an intensive investigation,”184 providing additional evidence that 
Title VII gives the EEOC significant investigative authority. 
Title VII is ambiguous regarding limitations upon the EEOC’s 
enforcement and investigatory authority.  Legislative history offers some 
insight, but in addition to statutory interpretation, a court applying 
Skidmore would also look for consistency in past interpretations of EEOC 
enforcement authority to determine whether the EEOC’s Title VII 
interpretation is persuasive. 
2.  Consistent Interpretations of the EEOC’s Enforcement Authority 
Since the Civil Rights Act of 1972, the contours of the EEOC’s 
authority have been molded both by court decisions and EEOC 
regulations.  Analyzing the various interpretations of the EEOC’s 
enforcement authority will shed light upon whether historical 
interpretations are consistent with the EEOC’s current interpretation at 
issue here. 
The EEOC has consistently interpreted Title VII as allowing it to 
exercise its enforcement authority outside any temporal limits.  In 
Occidental, the Supreme Court upheld the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 
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finding that the EEOC is not subject to a 180-day limitation on its authority 
to sue and is not governed by the state statute of limitations.185  The Court 
noted that Title VII only gives the EEOC one time-based limitation, which 
is found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).186  The Supreme Court also stated 
that “the EEOC does not function simply as a vehicle for conducting 
litigation on behalf of private parties; it is a federal administrative agency 
charged with the responsibility of investigating claims of employment 
discrimination and settling disputes.”187  Therefore, Title VII did not create 
the EEOC to focus only on the individual’s interests when it investigates 
a claim. 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation that the EEOC is not a litigation 
“vehicle”188 is consistent with the way the EEOC interpreted its power in 
29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3).  Similar to 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3), 
Occidental gives the EEOC the ability to exercise its enforcement 
authority outside of regulated temporal limits.  Further, the Court’s 
holding in Occidental establishes that the EEOC’s enforcement power is 
not subject to the same limits upon an individual’s ability to sue, such as a 
statute of limitations.  This suggests the Court interprets Title VII to allow 
the EEOC to operate separately from the aggrieved individual. 
The notion that the EEOC is a vehicle for enforcement separate from 
the individual is echoed in General Telephone Co. v. EEOC.189  In General 
Telephone Co., the Supreme Court addressed whether Rule 23 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prevents the EEOC from seeking class-
wide relief for a discrimination claim.190  While the Court analyzed the 
plain meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1), it also assessed the purpose 
of Title VII, finding that a Rule 23 limitation would frustrate the purpose 
of the EEOC’s enforcement power.191 
The Court stated that it is within the “clear purpose” of 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5(f)(1)  to give the EEOC “authority to bring suit in its own name 
for the purpose, among others, of securing relief for a group of aggrieved 
individuals.”192  The Court noted that the 1972 Title VII amendments 
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allow for an individual employee to bring a private action separate of the 
EEOC.193  This provision seemed to “suggest that the EEOC is not merely 
a proxy for the victims of discrimination and that the EEOC’s enforcement 
suits should not be considered representative actions subject to Rule 
23.”194 
General Telephone Co. asserts that the EEOC is expected to bring 
suits as part of its duty to eradicate discrimination in the workplace.195  29 
C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) allows the EEOC to bring suits to accomplish this 
goal, while also allowing individuals to bring separate actions. 
Finally, in EEOC v. Waffle House,196 the Supreme Court analyzed 
whether the EEOC may continue to seek victim-specific compensation 
once the aggrieved employee has signed an arbitration agreement with the 
employer.197  The Court found the EEOC was not limited by the actions of 
the employee and that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) unambiguously made the 
EEOC the “master of its own case.”198  The Court pointed out that Title 
VII clearly gives the EEOC command over the employee’s claim because 
of the authority Title VII expressly grants to the agency.199  Title VII gives 
the EEOC the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the employee’s 
claim for 180 days, to issue a right-to-sue letter to the employee, and to 
file suit in its own name.200  From Title VII, the Court concluded the EEOC 
may determine how and when to bring a judicial claim, and to hold 
otherwise would be an abuse of the court’s power.201 
In accordance with the idea that the EEOC is the “master of its own 
case,” its interpretation of Title VII in 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) gives it 
the authority to decide when it will enforce the case.202  Even after issuing 
a right-to-sue letter, the regulation allows the EEOC to continue to 
investigate the charge if it “determines at that time or at a later time that it 
would effectuate the purpose of Title VII . . . to further process the 
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charge.”203 
From these cases, a clear pattern of interpretation emerges.  The EEOC 
has consistently interpreted its authority as allowing it to exercise 
enforcement separately from the individual employee.  This interpretation 
has been upheld by the Supreme Court, which found support in Title VII 
and public policy.  The EEOC’s interpretation that it may investigate 
claims after issuing a right-to-sue is not a far cry from the interpretations 
made in Occidental, General Telephone Co., and Waffle House.  The 
EEOC’s regulation here is thus a consistent interpretation of its 
enforcement power under Title VII. 
3.  Public Policy Implications 
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of this issue is whether allowing 
the EEOC to investigate after issuing a right-to-sue letter would have 
positive or negative public policy implications.  Those who evaluate the 
policy issues are left weighing the interests of employees, employers, and 
the public.  While the Fifth, Ninth, and Seventh Circuits touched briefly 
upon this issue, they only mentioned a few of the implications upon the 
employer and the employee and failed to truly dive into the public policy 
implications.204 
While it should not be used as the sole method to determine whether 
an agency interpretation is valid, assessing the public policy implications 
can be a tool for evaluating the persuasiveness of an agency interpretation 
under Skidmore.205  While advocates on both sides of the controversy raise 
important points, limiting the EEOC’s investigative authority will result 
in far more troubling consequences, lending a more persuasive argument 
in favor of the EEOC’s interpretation.  The public policy implications 
include protecting the public interest, protecting the employee’s interest, 
protecting the employer’s interests, and checking the EEOC’s agency 
power. 
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a.  Protecting the Public Interest 
One reason the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hearst was flawed is 
because it erroneously assumed the EEOC and the employee acted as one 
party in conducting the four stages of Title VII enforcement.  The Fifth 
Circuit held that the fourth stage of enforcement begins once the employee 
initiates litigation, thus moving the EEOC out of the investigation stage.206  
However, as the Ninth Circuit pointed out in Federal Express, the Fifth 
Circuit in Hearst does not explain why the enforcement stage must bring 
an end to the EEOC’s investigation.207  Hearst provides a scheme that is 
contrary to the purpose of the EEOC. 
Legislative history tells us the EEOC was created by Congress to put 
a stop to workplace discrimination by enforcing “pattern or practice 
suits.”208  This emphasizes that the purpose of the EEOC’s enforcement 
authority is for more than simply litigating on behalf of private 
individuals.209  When the EEOC investigates, it does so with the public 
interest in mind, and it enforces Title VII to protect the public from the 
harmful consequences of an employer’s discriminatory conduct.  The 
EEOC should therefore not be controlled by the actions of an individual 
employee, who only acts on her own behalf. 
If courts determined the EEOC’s investigations must end after an 
aggrieved employee receives a right-to-sue letter, it is not difficult to 
imagine various scenarios that would be contrary to the public’s interest 
in preventing workplace discrimination.  For example, many employees 
who file complaints with the EEOC face threats to their employment.  
Because they are confronting the possibility of losing their paychecks, 
aggrieved employees do not always think they have time to wait for the 
EEOC to conduct a thorough investigation of an employer’s pattern of 
discrimination.  Conversely, the public has an interest in seeking out and 
stopping those employers who systematically discriminate in the 
workplace, a feat that the EEOC is usually more equipped to handle than 
an individual employee.  The EEOC can achieve greater results by suing 
on behalf of an entire workforce than an individual employee seeking 
damages for herself.  Low settlement payments to an individual employee 
is hardly a deterrent to a discriminating employer.  If an employee’s own 
suit ends the EEOC’s claim, the employer is more likely to continue his 
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pattern of discrimination against other employees. 
Title VII assumes an administrative agency has greater resources and 
influence than an individual to root out pervasive discrimination practices 
in the workplace.  Because of the high number of charges that are filed 
with the EEOC on a regular basis,210 it may not always be practical for the 
EEOC to wait the full 180 days on every charge filed with the agency 
before it can give employees the right to bring their own claims.  Without 
the ability to simultaneously discharge a right-to-sue letter to the 
individual employee while continuing to investigate an employer’s pattern 
of discrimination, the EEOC is forced to decide between protecting the 
individual and protecting the public.  This is contrary to the EEOC’s 
purpose under Title VII, as it would not allow the EEOC to enforce both 
pattern and practice suits to eradicate widespread discrimination practices. 
b.  Protecting the Employee’s Interests 
The dilemma above also has the possibility of harming the employee.  
The 1972 amendments to Title VII were not supposed to replace an 
employee’s private right of action with EEOC suits.211  In fact, legislative 
history shows that Congress specifically did not want to undermine the 
employee’s ability to seek judicial relief.212 
Title VII creates an expectation that the EEOC will first use 
conciliation before resorting to litigation.213  Therefore, the EEOC’s 
primary interest is reaching a peaceable solution outside the courtroom.  
This interest, however, may not be shared by the employee.  If the EEOC’s 
authority is terminated by the issuance of a right-to-sue letter, it may be 
reluctant to issue the letter to an aggrieved employee.  However, if 
workplace discrimination caused the employee harm, it is easy to believe 
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she may have an interest in pursuing litigation.214 
Further, a limitation upon the EEOC’s ability to investigate claims 
would create an unfair loophole for employers.  If the EEOC could no 
longer investigate after an employee receives a right-to-sue letter, 
employers might be incentivized to settle with the employee for a 
relatively small amount, knowing the employee has little bargaining 
power.  The employer could then continue its discriminatory practices in 
the workplace without fear of enforcement from the EEOC and the 
employee would not receive the damages he or she could have been 
entitled to in a court of law.215 
c.  Protecting the Employer’s Interests 
Some argue that a temporal limit upon the EEOC’s investigative 
power is necessary to protect employers.  In his dissenting opinion in 
Waffle House, Justice Thomas expressed concern that a refusal to limit the 
EEOC’s enforcement power would allow an employee “two bites at the 
apple”216—one bite from his or her private litigation and one bite from 
EEOC enforced litigation.217  Although this is a concern, there are ways to 
minimize the unfair effects of getting “two bites at the apple.”218  If the 
employee wins both the individual claim and the EEOC claim, the court 
can restrict the damages award.  In fact, as the majority points out in Waffle 
House, the courts are already expected to limit damages to prevent double 
recovery.219  The EEOC will therefore not be awarded victim-specific 
relief if the victim has already received damages. 
Despite the limits upon damages, allowing the EEOC to continue 
litigation after issuing a right-to-sue letter could still cause the employer 
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to take a double-hit.  EEOC investigations are costly and time-
consuming,220 and public litigation could cause severe damage to an 
employer’s reputation.221  But it is important to note the likelihood that the 
EEOC would continue to investigate a claim after the employee has 
already been issued a right-to-sue letter is very low.222 
Further, Title VII does contain some provisions to ensure fairness to 
the employer and to offer protection from frivolous claims.  Under the 
statute, the EEOC is able to bring litigation only after it has determined: 
(1) there is reasonable cause, and (2) attempts to achieve a peaceable 
settlement have failed.223  When evaluating reasonable cause, if the 
employee has already received judgment from her own civil action, such 
as in Union Pacific,224 the EEOC will probably consider the employee’s 
civil action judgment.  If the EEOC still finds there is reasonable cause to 
believe there is discrimination, the employer has the chance to avoid 
litigation by participating with the EEOC in settlement and conciliation 
methods.  While these methods can also be expensive and time-consuming 
for the employer, it is far better than a civil trial. 
Finally, the EEOC’s inability to continue enforcement after issuing a 
right-to-sue letter could negatively affect conciliation efforts.  Imagine a 
situation in which the EEOC feels it is in the best interest of the public to 
retain control over a claim and therefore rejects an employee’s right-to-
sue letter before the expiration of 180 days.  After conducting a thorough 
investigation, the EEOC decides to begin conciliation efforts between the 
employee and the employer.  Even if the employer is eager to reach a fair 
settlement, the aggrieved employee could be less willing to compromise.  
For this reason, the EEOC and the employer’s conciliation efforts could 
be undermined by an aggrieved employee who desires more compensation 
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for her claim.  Interferences with the EEOC’s conciliation authority is in 
direct conflict with Title VII’s intentions.225 
d.  Checking Agency Power 
Critics of the broadly conferred investigative power also worry that 
investigations would have the potential to continue longer than necessary 
if they are not limited.  Employers should not have to live in fear of facing 
constant EEOC investigations, nor should the EEOC be able to operate 
freely without checks upon its power.  However, the fear of constant 
EEOC investigations in the workplace is not necessarily realistic.226  
Although 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) gives the EEOC the authority to 
decide when it will enforce a case, the EEOC is still subject to limitations 
on its enforcement power.  From a practical perspective, the EEOC works 
with a limited budget and an increasingly large caseload.227  There simply 
is not enough time or money for the EEOC to spend months investigating 
every claim they receive.  The EEOC also operates under the watchful and 
political eye of taxpayers.  It would be impracticable for the EEOC to keep 
investigations pending indefinitely, or to conduct “fishing expeditions” on 
employers.  It is usual practice for the EEOC to terminate investigations 
after issuing a right-to-sue letter.228  In fact, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.28(a)(3) 
states that, once an employee receives a right-to-sue letter, the EEOC will 
stop the investigation, unless it determines that the investigation should 
remain open to “effectuate the purpose of Title VII.”229  While, as this 
Comment argues, this provision does not put temporal limits upon the 
EEOC, it does direct the EEOC to only continue investigations when there 
is compelling evidence of workplace discrimination.  Therefore, the 
EEOC would rarely find reason to continue its investigations after it issues 
a right-to-sue letter. 
Despite this issue’s rarity, it is in the public’s best interest that the 
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EEOC retain the authority to continue investigations after issuing a right-
to-sue letter.  To hold otherwise would create harmful effects for victims 
of workplace discrimination and perpetuate discriminatory practices. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Since the creation of the EEOC, courts have debated the extent of the 
Commission’s enforcement and investigative powers under Title VII.  The 
lack of guidance on how courts should analyze the EEOC’s Title VII 
interpretations led to a circuit split among the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth 
Circuits.  The circuit courts failed to address the issue of deference, but 
determining which level of deference, if any, the EEOC’s interpretation of 
Title VII is entitled to should have been the starting point.  This Comment 
argues the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII is entitled to Skidmore 
deference.  Once courts know the level of deference to give the EEOC, 
they can then go on to ask whether the EEOC’s interpretation of its 
investigative authority is a persuasive interpretation of Title VII, and thus, 
an appropriate exercise of its enforcement authority. 
Under Skidmore, a persuasive interpretation of Title VII has statutory 
authority, past interpretations that are consistent with the one at issue, and 
public policy reasons supporting it.  After analyzing these three elements, 
it would be proper to conclude that the EEOC’s investigatory authority is 
not limited to the actions of the aggrieved employee. Thus, 29 C.F.R. § 
1601.28(a)(3) is a valid interpretation of Title VII.  The Supreme Court 
and Title VII give the EEOC broad authority to investigate and enforce 
discrimination claims.  Limiting this authority would undermine the 
EEOC’s purpose.  Title VII’s mandate that an employee must file a formal 
charge before the EEOC may investigate is only indicative of when 
Congress intended the investigatory stage to begin, and not to dictate when 
it must end.  Legislative history lends its support to this conclusion.  
Furthermore, there are serious public policy implications that would arise 
if the EEOC’s power is limited by the employee’s litigation. 
The EEOC’s investigative power is only one facet of the agency’s 
relatively broad authority to eliminate widespread workplace 
discrimination.  As courts determine whether this authority should be 
limited, they must take care to analyze each aspect of the agency’s 
authority.  Perhaps most importantly, the courts should remember the 
implications EEOC limitations will have upon the federal government’s 
ability to regulate harmful workplace practices. 
 
